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Abstract:  The  impact  of  food  safety  standards  on  international  trade  has  already  been  addressed. 
Generally, economists try to assess trade losses borne by exporters when importing countries impose 
stricter  regulations.  In  this  paper  we  assess  the  impact  of  the  Maximum  Residue  Levels  (MRL)  of 
pesticides on the trade of apples and pears. Rather than focusing on a particular pesticide we take into 
account the entire list of substances set out by the various regulations with the aim is to understand how 
the  similarity  (or  dissimilarity)  of  these  can  affect  trade.  Most  studies  assess  the  impact  of  sanitary 
standard regulations introducing directly in the analysis the MLR put in force in the importing country. 
We assume that what can be crucial is the difference in the tolerance levels of both the importing and 
exporting country. Having built a similarity index we then introduce it into a gravity equation to assess the 
impact of differences in MRL of pesticides on the trade of apples and pears of seven exporting and seven 
importing countries. Results suggest that harmonizing regulations impacts trade differently depending on 
the exporter.  
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Previous research has already addressed how food safety standards affect international 
trade (Henson and Mitullah, 2000; Otsuki and al., 2001a and 2001b; Wilson and Otsuki, 2003; 
Wilson and Otsuki, 2004; Moenius 2006). Generally, economists try to assess trade losses borne 
by  exporters  when  importing  countries  impose  stricter  regulations.  Standards  affect  trade 
competitiveness insofar as they imply a cost of compliance on producers which increases the 
price of a product. Furthermore it is a commonly accepted result in the literature that standards 
are trade-impeding; at least for agfood trade from developing countries. However there are some 
studies that highlight a positive impact on trade. Moenius (2006) has sought to show a positive 
impact of exporters standards on agfood trade as they can establish trust and reduce search costs 
for consumers. Disdier and al. (2008) report the dual effects of SPS and TBTs in agriculture 
which can have no impact on trade or even facilitate it as they carry information and confidence 
on the imported products. Following Li and Beghin (2010), the literature shows a wide range of 
estimated  effects  from  significantly  impeding  trade to  significantly  promoting it.  Henson  and 
Jaffee (2008) argue that exporters facing strict food safety standards incur a cost of compliance 
which may be offset by an array of benefits from the enhancement of food management capacity. 
Departing from this argument, we assess the impact of the Maximum Residue Levels 
(MRL) of pesticides on the trade of apples and pears. The MRL is an index which represents the 
maximum concentration of a pesticide residue (expressed as mg/kg) legally permitted in food 
commodities and animal feeds. MRL on food imports are set by each country and are imposed as 
regulatory standards at the border Wilson and Otsuki (2004). We consider that apples and pears 
are a good case-study as these fruits are affected by numerous phytosanitary treatments and are 
also among the most traded fruits in the world along with oranges. The objective is to compare 
the  "closeness"  of  standards.  We  seek  to  understand  how  the  similarity  (or  dissimilarity)  in 
regulations can affect trade. Indeed, most studies examine the regulations put in force in the 
importing country. We assume that what can be crucial is the difference in the tolerance levels of 
both  the  importing  and  exporting  country.  A  country  which  imposes  already  strict  domestic 
tolerance  levels  on  pesticides  residues  may  have  fewer  difficulties  in  complying  with  the 
requisites of a stringent importer given that its producers have already coped with the cost of 
compliance of maintaining low residue levels. 
Unlike other studies we do not introduce a single substance into the analysis but take into 
account the entire list of pesticides which appear in the various regulations. Moreover the level of 
the standard set by the importer is not taken into consideration but rather the differences between 
the importer and the exporter standards. This is done using a similarity index. A similarity index 
has already been used in the literature to compare regulations on Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMO) (Vigani et al., 2010) or varieties of grapes and wines (Anderson 2009 and 2010). In all 
cases  the  methodology  is  adapted  from  Jaffe  (1986).  We  use  the  distance  associated  to  the 
Pearson's correlation coefficient to measure the proximity between regulations then we introduce 
this index into a gravity model. We assess the bilateral impact of MRL of pesticides for seven 
exporters (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, the EU, New Zealand and South Africa) and seven 
importers (Australia, Canada Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, The US) of fresh and processed
2 
apples and pears. These countries have been chosen on the basis of four non excluding criteria (i) 
their share in the international trade of apples and pears; (ii) the level of their consumption of 
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these fruits; (iii) their presumed stringency in regulations; (iv) the availability of data on their 
MRL of pesticides. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the MRL regulations 
in force in importing and exporting countries and details the construction of the similarity index. 
Section  3  deals  with  the  econometric  model  and  data  and  presents  the  results.  Section  4 
concludes. 
 
2 Maximum Residues Levels of pesticides: an unharmonized frame 
Pesticide is a generic term which includes all substances used to avoid or control pests. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization defines it as: "any substance or mixture of substances 
intended for preventing, destroying or controlling any pest, including vectors of human or animal 
disease, unwanted species of plants or animals causing harm during or otherwise interfering with 
the production, processing, storage, transport or marketing of food, agricultural commodities, 
wood  and  wood  products  or  animal  feedstuffs, or  substances  which  may  be  administered  to 
animals  for the  control  of  insects,  arachnids  or  other  pests  in or  on  their  bodies.  The  term 
includes substances intended for use as a plant growth regulator, defoliant, desiccant or agent 
for thinning fruit or preventing the premature fall of fruit, and substances applied to crops either 
before  or  after  harvest  to  protect  the  commodity  from  deterioration  during  storage  and 
transport."  
Furthermore pesticides are often hazardous substances that cause harmful or deleterious 
effects on human or animal and plant health through exposure or dietary intake as they tend to 
stay in the products in which they have been sprayed even when they are peeled or washed. In 
order to safeguard consumer health and to promote good agricultural practices, maximum levels 
of residues of pesticides have been set worldwide. Public authorities regulate these levels based 
on scientific prediction of an acceptable daily intake (ADI) of residue. When the science is not 
able to derive an ADI some countries decide to set their MLR at a very low default level on the 
basis of the precautionnary principle. 
International harmonization of MRL does not exist at a global level. Even though the 
Codex  Alimentarius  has  fixed  levels,  they  are  not  statutory.  National  authorities  hold  the 
sovereignty in fixing these limits. Therefore these legal limits can vary widely from one country 
to another. Regarding pesticides residues, there are as many regulations as countries. The number 
of pesticides registered and the MRL set vary greatly from one country to another. Some have 
adopted very severe rules with MRL well below the Codex settings and zero-tolerance provisions 
for disallowed or prohibited substances or for which a MRL cannot be established due to the lack 
of  toxicological  data.  This  is  the  case  of  the  Russian  Federation  which  was  the  target  of 
complaints for the stringency of its standards. Whereas other countries have decided to adopt 
international standards set up by the Codex. This is for example the case in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Korea, New Zealand or South Africa. Another important difference is the list of substances 
registered in regulations. Some countries (eg. the US or the EU) have a very detailed list while 
others  provide  a  limited  number  of  pesticides  but  zero  tolerance  provisions  or  a  very  low 
tolerance level for those which are not registered (as in Australia, Canada or Mexico). Other 
countries have more complicated system. For example, Korea imposes 236 limits for apples and 
210 for pears. If a limit is not set for a product, the Codex standard shall apply, otherwise the 
limit for the most similar product applies. If none of these solutions are applicable, the lowest 
limit for MRL of pesticides shall apply (equal to 0.01 mg/kg). New Zealand has 112 limits for 
apples  and  107  for  pears.  Codex  MRL  are  recognised  for  imported  food,  Australian  MRL 
recognised for food imported from Australia. If no MRL exists, a default MRL of 0.1 mg/kg 4 
 
applies. In Russia limits are set for 124 pesticides for apples and 122 for pears. In 2008 Russia 
signed two bilateral memorandums with the EU and Chile. They stipulate that 'if there is no 
Maximum Residue Level for pesticide residues, nitrates and nitrites specified for a certain type of 
product in the Russian legislation, the MRL for the most similar product included in the same 
commodity group (as defined in the Codex Alimentarius) applies, and that if there is no MRL for 
the commodity group, the MRL of the Codex Alimentarius applies. If there is no MRL of the 
Codex Alimentarius, the MRL of the country of origin applies'.  
The issue of non harmonization of food safety regulation and its possible impact on trade 
has already been questioned. Wilson and Otsuki (2003) have estimated that adopting the Codex 
standard on Aflatoxin B1 would raise world cereal and nut exports up by US$ 38.8 millions. 
Wilson and Otsuki (2004) assessed the impact on trade of harmonizing the MRL of chlorpyrifos 
on banana trade between 21 exporting countries and 11 OECD importing countries. They found 
that increasing the stringency of the MLR of this pesticide would have a negative impact on 
trade. 
We  investigate  the  influence  of  MRL  of  pesticides  on  trade  flows  between  seven 
importers and seven exporters of fresh and processed apples and pears. Countries in the sample 
have been chosen on the basis of four non exclusive criteria (i) their share in the international 
trade of apples and pears; (ii) the level of their consumption of these fruits; (iii) their presumed 
stringency in regulations; (iv) the availability of data on the MRL of pesticides they have set. The 
impact of the non harmonisation in regulation and how it affect trade of these two fruits is also 
assessed. We assume that concerning MRL, the main point is the similarity between regulations 
more than the absolute level of stringency and presume that producers operating in a country 
which  already  impose  stringent  standards  would  have  fewer  difficulties  in  complying  with 
stringent import standards.  
We use a direct measure of standards to compute an index measuring the (dis)similarity in 
regulations, and assume that similar regulations enhance trade while different regulations impede 
trade. An index is then built based on the MRL of pesticides set by each country on apples and 
pears to  assess the  impact  of  these regulations on trade.  The  main difference  from  previous 
studies (Otsuki et al. 2001; Wilson et al. 2003; Wilson and Otsuki 2004 or Xion and Beghin 
2010) is that we compute our index based on all pesticides found in those regulations rather than 
just one or two main substances. In the literature the similarity index has been used by Anderson 
(2009, 2010) or Vigani et al. (2010). Anderson (2009 and 2010) uses varietal-based Regional 
Similarity  Index  adapted  from  the  Jaffe  (1986)  methodology  to  investigate  the  regional 
"closeness" of grapes and wine in Australia and in the world. Vigani et al. (2010) use the same 
methodology to investigate how the similarity or dissimilarity in GMO regulation affects bilateral 
trade. Their study show that countries with strong differences in GMO regulations trade less 
suggesting that an international harmonization is needed. We do not use the Jaffe's index but 
instead compute the distance associated to the Pearson's coefficient correlation. 
k
ij SIM  is the Pearson distance and it is computed as : 
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Where  n is the number of pesticides registered, 
k
ip x  is the MRL of the exporting country 
i for pesticide  p  and product k .  
The Pearson's correlation coefficient lies in the range [-1,1], the corresponding distance 5 
 
falls between [0,2]. A value of SIM  equal to 0 means that the two compared samples are similar.  
Something must be said on the building of the MRL database from which we derived our 
SIM  index. As pointed out in the first section, regulations are very dissimilar between countries 
and  n is different from one country to another. We choose to introduce into the index all the 
pesticides found in the regulations analysed. A total of  n = 749 pesticides are registered. But if 
some pesticides are common to all regulations, it is not the case for all. Then when a pesticide 
does not appear in a country list, the default value applies. In the case that no default value is 
available  we  consider  the  pesticide  as  authorized  by  the  national  regulation  and  arbitrarily 
attribute it a value of 75 (the maximum value found in all regulations). 
Values of the index of similarity are represented in figures A1 and A2. We find clear 
differences between exporters. Argentina, the EU and New Zealand display index of similarity 
lower than 1 indicating high "correlation" with the regulation of their partners, while Brazil, 
Chile, China and South Africa displays values greater than 1 which can indicate a lower level of 
similarity. It is interesting to notice that Brazil, Chile and South Africa apply the value of the 
Codex as default value. 
 
3 Model specification and data 
In order to assess the impact of pesticides residues standards on trade of apples and pears, 
we use a gravity model. Apples and pears are a particularly good case-study as these fruits are 
greatly  affected  by  contaminants  such  as  pesticides  because  of  the  numerous  phytosanitary 
treatments they are subject to and because these substances tend to stay in products even when 
they  are  peeled  or  washed.  Moreover,  they  are  products  of  the  temperated  zone  involving 
countries both from developed and developing areas. They are the most-highly consumed fruits 
(along with oranges) in the US and the EU. They are easily shipped and represent important 
levels of trade both in value and volume. On the global apple market few players are involved. 
China, the EU, Chile and the USA capture the lion's share of 75 percent of the apples world 
exports. In 2009 China was the first world provider of apples with 1 million tons of fresh apples 
sold followed by the EU. Concerning the import side, the EU and Russia distinguish themselves 
as they represent almost half of the total imports of apples. In 2009 the first apple trade partner of 
the EU27 was the Federation of Russia. The same actors are involved in the trade of pears.  
The use of a gravity equation allows us to avoid imposing pre-established hypotheses on 
the direction of trade and to use econometric techniques. Gravity modeling has already been 
widely used to estimate the effect of regulations on hazardous substances on trade. For example, 
Wilson and Otsuki (2004) use gravity modeling to assess the impact of regulations on MRL of 
pesticides of 11 OECD countries on banana trade from 21 developing countries. They include in 
their equation a direct measure of the food safety standard using the level of the MRL of the 
hazardous substance imposed by the importing country. We assume here that the absolute level 
does not matter. But what is important is the relative level between the exporting and importing 
country. If a country imposes stringent rules on its producers they will bear a cost in order to 
comply with these rules. This cost will certainly affect their price-competitiveness but at the same 
time they  will  be more  capable of  accessing  a  country  which  also  imposes  tight  rules.  This 
argument  has  been  supported  by  Harris  and  al.  (2002)  who  have  evidenced  that  stringent 
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Where i stands for exporter,  j  for importer,  k  for product and t for the time. The time 
period covered by our estimation starts from the year 2000 and ends in 2008. In our model  k  is 
defined at the 6 digit-level of the 1996 harmonized system. This level of deseggregation does not 
cause too much of a problem as apples and pears are homogeneous products and are defined at 
this level (080810 for apples and 080820 for pears). It is not exactly the same for the processed 
product and that is the reason why we limit the analysis to dried apples (081330), apple juice 
(200970) and preserved pears (200840). Importing countries are Australia, Canada, Republic of 
Korea,  Japan,  Mexico,  Russian  Federation  and  USA,  while  EU27,  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile, 
China, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa are the exporting countries. 
k
ijt X   is  the  yearly  exportation  of  product  k   from  country  i  to  country  j .  Data  are 
obtained  from  the  United  Nations  database  on  trade (COMTRADE).  They  are  in  US  dollar. 
it GDP  and  jt GDP  are the real Gross Domestic Products (in 2000 constant US dollars). GDPs 
measure the potential import demand and export supply of country  i and country  j , hence the 
coefficients of  1 β  and  2 β  are expected to be positive. GDPs come from the World Development 
indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (WB).  it POP  and  jt POP  are the number of inhabitants of 
country  i and country  j  in year t. These datasets are from the WDI of the WB. They measure 
the respective size of the country and the sign of  3 β  and  4 β  is not a priori defined (Oguledo and 
Macphee, 1994).  ij Dist  is the distance between the capitals of country  i and country  j . This 
variable is a proxy of the trade cost and  5 β  is expected to be negative. Distances come from the 
Centre  d'Etudes  Prospectives  et  d'Informations  Internationales  (CEPII). 
k
ij SIM   measures  the 
(dis)similarity between regulations on pesticides residues in force in country i and country  j  for 
product k . This regressor is time invariant  =
k k
ijt ij SIM SIM  for all t because the values of MRL do 
not change over the whole period. The sign of  6 β  is expected to be negative because the lower 
k
ij SIM  the higher the similarity  between country  i and country  j  regulations. 
k
ij Tarif  is the 
applied  ad-valorem  customs  tariff  impose  by  country  j   on  imports  from  country  i.  7 β   is 
expected to be negative. Data come from CEPII's MacMAps database, national regulations and 
World Trade Organisation.  ijt Transp  is an index measuring the difference between country i and 
j  's degree of transparency and corruption. Nothing can be said a priori on the sign of  8 β . This 
variable is introduced because it influences the respect of the rules and can increase or decrease 
the Data come from www.transparency.org.  ij Lang  and  ij Border  are dummy variables equal to 1 
if i and  j  share a common language and 0 otherwise and to 1 if i and  j  share a common border 
and 0 otherwise, respectively. Sharing a common language means that there are some cultural 
links  between  countries  which  is  favorable  to  trade,  hence  the  sign  of  the  corresponding 
coefficient  9 β  should be positive. Sharing a common border is also expected to have a positive 




ijt ε  is the error term that is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. 
Our sample has 5525 observations, 1867 are non zero observations and 3658 are zero 
observations,  some  of  these  zero  maybe  due  to  rounding  errors  or  incompleteness  of 
COMTRADE data, but others may reflect the absence of trade between importing and exporting 
countries. 
 
3 Estimation results 
 The simplest way to estimate a gravity equation is by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). But 
OLS suffer from a lot of econometric issues. Among them, the log-linearization of the variables 
can lead to biased estimations in presence of heteroskedasticity as showed by Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). They suggest to use it instead of the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) method. PPML can help dealing with heteroskedasticity but assumes that the dependent 
variable is equidispersed and then fails in presence of overdispersion (i.e. when the variance of 
occurences  exceeds  their  mean).  This  issue  can  be  resolved  using  the  Negative  Binomial 
Regression (NBR) where the unobserved heterogeneity among observations is included in the 
conditional mean by adding a dispersion parameter in the specification of the variance. 
The third issue is that of the presence of too many zeros. PPML and NBR assume that all 
pairs of countries have a positive probability of trading (Burger et al. 2009). But the presence of 
zero may come either from roundings or from what is called self-selection (Xiong and Beghin, 
2010). Self-selection occurs when the complete lack of trade between country pairs is due to a 
lack of resources or to distances, differences in specialization, seasonality, etc. To overcome this 
issue, zero-inflated models (ZIM) may help. These models allow the zero to be produced by two 
different process. They consider the existence of two latent groups. The first one has strictly zero 
counts while the second has a non zero probability of counts different from zero. Zero-inflated 
models are two-step models. The first step uses a binary model and the second step a count 
model. The binary model can be estimated using either a probit or a logit while PPML or NBR 
can be used for the count model (including zero). 
The specification of the ZIP model is:  
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k
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Two statistic tests allow us to choose between various methods of estimation. First, the 
value of the Reset test is always greater in the case of the NBR and ZINB compared to OLS and 
PPML.  The  Vuong  test  allows  us  to  discriminate  against  the  use  of  zero-inflated  models 
searching for significant evidence of excessive zero counts. A Vuong test significantly positive 
supports the use of zero-inflated models. We then focus on the estimations performed using the 
negative binomial regression and its zero inflated counterpart on pooled data. The specification 
includes  country  pairs  fixed  effects  and  time  fixed  effects  to  control  for  time  and  country 
variations. Results are reported in Table 1. Results from NBR estimation are in column 1 while 
results from ZINB are in column 2, the two sets of estimates are highly similar and lead to the 
same conclusions. 
As the model is in log-linear form, coefficient estimates can be considered as elasticities. 
The  coefficients  of  the  GDP  are  positive  and  significant  for  both  exporting  and  importing 
countries. The size of the population impacts trade positively for exporters and negatively for 
importers. As expected, the coefficients of the distance and tariff are negative in all regressions 
even if not always significant. Those of common border and common language are positive. The 
coefficient of the transparency index is not always significant but negative in all regressions what 
could suggest a negative impact on trade. Finally, focusing on the variable of interest, we find in 
all estimations that the coefficient  SIM  is negative and strongly significant. This means that 
increasing the similarity (reducing the distance) in regulations would have a positive impact on 
the trade of apples and pears.  
We have then redone the estimations of our model replacing the  SIM  index with an 
interaction term between the exporting country fixed effect and the  SIM  variable, and have then 
7 new variables corresponding to the 7 exporting countries. This leads to another picture. Results 
show that this interaction term is negative and significant for Chile and South Africa, negative 
but not significant for Brazil. These countries are also those which have an index of similarity 
greater than 1 with almost all importers. A reduction of the distance between them and their 
partners would mean more trade as a reputation effect. The cases of Argentina and China are 
completely different. Even if they have indexes of similarity lower than or equal to one, their 
coefficients are positive and significant. This suggests that increasing the similarity in regulations 
with the importers under scrutiny can result in trade diverting. Increasing the strictness of their 
standards could imply a higher effort of adaptation from producers in these countries to comply 
with  stricter  domestic  rules  increasing  the  cost  of  the  product  and  decreasing  their 
competitiveness. For the EU25 and New Zealand, the high income countries of the sample, the 
results are rather expected, the coefficient is negative but not significant. This suggests that the 
standards imposed by any exporter do not represent a barrier for those countries which impose 
already strict rules on their domestic market. 
In order to test the robustness of our analysis we replicate all the estimations using very 
different methods (OLS, PPML, Zero-inflated Poisson model and Hurdel Double Model). The 
standard gravity covariates have the expected signs, distance is negative and significant, tariff is 
negative and significant, language and border dummies have a positive sign. Focusing on our 
variable of interest, in all estimations the coefficient of SIM  is negative and significant, meaning 
that reducing the distance between MRL regulations is trade-enhancing. As a further robustness 
check we run the gravity equation year by year and the results are still confirmed. Finally, we 
replicate  all  the  estimations  with  the  Heckman  two  step  procedure.  The  results  are  also 




Table 1 : Estimations on pooled data 
  NBREG  ZINB  NBREG  ZINB 
GDP   9.316***  8.091***  8.734***  8.031*** 
  [1.998]  [1.176]  [1.875]  [0.810] 
GDP   4.175***  3.643***  3.851***  3.453*** 
  [0.453]  [0.478]  [0.533]  [0.467] 
POP   -16.611***  -10.642***  -15.629***  -9.106*** 
  [1.957]  [1.768]  [2.019]  [1.399] 
POP   10.223**  14.527***  10.070***  15.162*** 
  [4.336]  [4.133]  [3.460]  [3.153] 
DIST    -0.872***  -0.491*  -0.221  -0.112 
  [0.151]  [0.261]  [0.170]  [0.157] 
TRANSP    -0.028*  -0.010*  -0.025***  -0.008 
  [0.014]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.008] 
Tarif    -0.089  -0.089***  -0.104  -0.096*** 
  [0.095]  [0.031]  [0.091]  [0.032] 
SIM    -0.864*  -0.628***     
  [0.514]  [0.228]     
Border    0.897  0.127  1.071*  0.178 
  [0.585]  [0.534]  [0.601]  [0.560] 
LANG    1.721***  1.061***  1.351***  0.999*** 
  [0.276]  [0.243]  [0.390]  [0.267] 
Argentina      1.632**  0.607* 
      [0.685]  [0.310] 
Brazil      -8.344**  -12.155 
      [3.351]  [11.021] 
Chile      -17.500***  -8.571*** 
      [4.426]  [2.355] 
China      9.676  14.757* 
      [9.029]  [8.734] 
New Zealand      -2.398  -2.108 
      [2.630]  [2.282] 
South Africa      -7.427  -11.699*** 
      [5.394]  [2.686] 
EU27      -0.78  -0.738 
      [0.841]  [0.479] 
Constant  -237.434  -368.733***  -232.361  -402.170*** 
  [161.884]  [109.980]  [145.052]  [66.555] 
Country FE  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Time FE  YES  YES  YES  YES 
RESET  0.6504  0.7964  0.4239  0.714 
VUONG Test    YES    YES 
Observations  5525  5525  5525  5525 











 The impact of MRL of pesticides on trade has been widely studied, but the focus is often 
put  on  trade  from  developing  countries  affected  by  the  stringency  of  developed  countries 
regulations. Moreover, in all studies only one or two main substances are taken into account 
whereas the list of pesticides settled down in the regulations are often impressive as it is the case 
for apples and pears. 
The aim of our analysis is to understand the role of pesticides MRL regulations on trade. 
We focus on apples and pears which are fruits mainly traded between developed countries as they 
grow  principally  in  the  temperated  zone.  We  are  interested  in  the  way  (dis)similarity  in 
regulations can affect trade. As a first step, we build an index of similarity between exporters and 
importers regulations. This index is based on the values of MRL for all the pesticides found in the 
regulations of countries under scrutiny. Then we introduce this index as an exogeneous variable 
in a gravity equation. 
The econometric results show, as expected, that similarity is globally trade enhancing. 
That is to say that increasing the similarity of regulations would lead to an increase in the value 
of trade. But this result must be mitigated on a case by case basis because on the apples and pears 
market  developed  countries  compete  with  developing  or  emerging  ones.  For  Argentina  and 
China, emerging countries of high degree of similarity with importers regulations ( 1 SIM ≤ ), 
increasing similarity may prove trade-diverting. For Chile, South Africa and Brazil, emerging or 
developing  countries  with  lower  degree  of  similarity  and  applying  the  Codex,  increasing 
similarity may impact trade positively (even though for Brazil the coefficient is not significant). 
Finally,  for  the  EU25  and  New  Zealand,  the  richest  countries  of  the  exporter  sample,  the 
standards of importers do not act as a barrier and increasing the similarity with their partners 
would have no effect on trade. 
Stringency in regulations of developed markets act in a twofold way. It increases the 
competitiveness of developed exporters and of developing exporters which make the effort to 
adapt their production process. It reduces the one of developing exporters like Brazil, Chile or 
South Africa which choose to impose lesser constraints on their producers. This state of fact is 
going to continue as it is hardly plausible that developed countries will increase the level of 
tolerance of residues in the future. It is often difficult for producers of developing countries to 
respect  the  standards  set  out  in  developed  markets.  Indeed,  even  if  a  producer  succeeds  in 
complying with the requisite imposed in the importing country, the low level of standards in 
force in its country could be harmful to its reputation. 
Finally the results also suggest that the impact of food safety standards on trade is now 
more significant than the impact of tariff which have been on continuous decline. 
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Figure A.2: Representation of the SIM index for pears 
 
 
 